000			03420cam a2200313 i 4500
001			20701003
003			MYCC
005			20250210123405.0
008			180821s2019 mau b 001 0 eng c
020			_a9780674975781 _q(alk. paper)
040			_aMH/DLC _beng _cMH _erda _dDLC _dMYCC
082	0	0	_a338.8/20973 _223
090	0	0	_a338.820973 _bBAK 2019
100	1		_aBaker, Jonathan B., _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe antitrust paradigm : _brestoring a competitive economy / _cJonathan B. Baker.
264		1	_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bHarvard University Press, _c2019.
300			_a349 pages ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aPart I. The market power paroxysm and the antitrust paradigm: Market power in an era of antitrust -- The faltering political consensus supporting antitrust -- Preventing the political misuse of antitrust -- Recalibrating error costs and presumptions -- Erroneous arguments against enforcement -- Part II. Antitrust rules and the information economy: Inferring agreement and algorithmic coordination -- Exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms -- Threats to innovation from lessened competition -- Harm to suppliers, workers, and platform users -- Part III. Looking forward: Restoring a competitive economy.
520			_aIn the 1970s, when the United States economy was struggling and the term "stagflation" was coined to capture inflation plus stagnant business growth, the "Chicago school" critique of antitrust rules gained ascendance. In the 1980s, during Ronald Reagan's two terms as president, that critique's policy prescriptions-the eliminating of or modifying anticompetitive rules to make them less restrictive-became common practice. As Jonathan Baker writes, "The Chicago approach to antitrust can be understood as a gamble. More relaxed antitrust rules would allow firms to achieve greater efficiencies, which would more than compensate for any risk of firms exercising market power. Put differently, the Chicagoans bet that antitrust reform could achieve long term consumer welfare gains without facilitating the creation of substantial and durable market power." The Antitrust Paradigm presents a wealth of evidence arguing that the Chicagoans lost their bet, and prescribes what should be done about it. Since the 1980s, not only has market power widened, economic productivity decline, and consumer welfare gains been modest at best, but also the economy has changed, most visibly in the information technology and Internet giants that top the financial market's valuation charts. Baker argues that both the failures of antitrust reform and the changed economy demand a new antitrust paradigm, one that restores a competitive economy through strengthened antitrust, recognizes antitrust's political context, and identifies the competitive harms from dominant information technology platforms. His book frames the problem, examines the distinctive competitive problems of the information economy, and concludes with a guide for restoring effective antitrust policies.-- _cProvided by publisher
650		0	_aAntitrust law _xEconomic aspects _zUnited States.
650		0	_aCompetition _zUnited States.
651		0	_aUnited States _xEconomic policy.
651		0	_aUnited States _xEconomic conditions _y1945-
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c370 _d370