000			03483cam a2200337 i 4500
001			21605779
003			MYCC
005			20250108124321.0
008			200709s2020 nyua b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780190908591 _q(hardback)
020			_z9780190908614 _q(epub)
020			_z9780190908607
020			_z9780190908621
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dMYCC
082	0	0	_a346.73048/6 _223
090	0	0	_a346.730486 _bBAR 2021
100	1		_aBarnett, Jonathan M., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aInnovators, firms, and markets : _bthe organizational logic of intellectual property / _cJonathan M. Barnett.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c[2021]
300			_axvi, 234 pages : _billustrations ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aDynamic analysis of intellectual property -- Organizational Effects of intellectual property (micro-level) -- Organizational effects of intellectual property (macro-level) -- Constructing an objective history of the U.S. patent system -- An organizational history of the U.S. patent system -- Exploding the supply chain : strong patents and vertical disintegration -- Why incumbents (usually) prefer weak intellectual property rights -- Organizational perspectives on intellectual property reform.
520			_a"This book presents a theoretical, historical and empirical account of the relationship between intellectual property rights, organizational type and market structure. Patents expand transactional choice by enabling smaller R&D-intensive firms to compete against larger firms that wield difficult-to-replicate financing, production and distribution capacities. In particular, patents enable upstream firms that specialize in innovation to exchange informational assets with downstream firms that specialize in commercialization, lowering capital and technical requirements that might otherwise impede entry. These theoretical expectations track a novel organizational history of the U.S. patent system during 1890-2006. Periods of strong patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which smaller innovators can monetize R&D through financing, licensing and other relationships with funding and commercialization partners. Periods of weak patent protection tend to support innovation ecosystems in which innovation and commercialization mostly take place within the end-to-end structures of large integrated firms. The proposed link between IP rights and organizational type tracks evidence on historical and contemporary patterns in IP lobbying and advocacy activities. In general, larger and more integrated firms (outside pharmaceuticals) tend to advocate for weaker patents, while smaller and less integrated firms (and venture capitalists who back those firms) tend to advocate for stronger patents. Contrary to conventional assumptions, the economics, history and politics of the U.S. patent system suggest that weak IP rights often shelter large incumbents from the entry threat posed by smaller R&D-specialist entities"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aIntellectual property.
650		0	_aPatent laws and legislation _zUnited States.
776	0	8	_iOnline version: _aBarnett, Jonathan M. _tInnovators, firms, and markets _dNew York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2020] _z9780190908614 _w(DLC) 2020031299
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c258 _d258